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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court by virtue of § 78-2a-3(2)(h), U.C.A. 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
and 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue: Whether the trial court abused its discretion by granting 
Appellee's/Respondent's Petition to Modify Alimony on the basis that Petitioner's 
increase in income represents a substantial change of circumstances not contemplated 
when the divorce decree was entered. 
Standard of Review: The determination by the trial court that there has or has not 
been a substantial change of circumstances is presumed valid and is therefore reviewed 
under an abuse of discretion standard. Bolliger v. Bolliger, 2000 UT App [^47, 997 P.2d 
903; Moon v. Moon, 1999 UT App 12, If 28. 
RELEVANT STATUTE: § 30-3-5(8)(g)(i), U.C.A. 
The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and new 
orders regarding alimony based on a substantial material change in circumstances 
not foreseeable at the time of the divorce. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a domestic case that was commenced nearly five years after the entry of a 
decree of divorce. On March 31, 2003 Respondent filed a petition to reduce or eliminate 
alimony that he was ordered to pay to Petitioner. (R. 92). The basis for Respondent's 
Petition rested on the substantial increase in Petitioner's income since the entry of the 
Decree. (R.91-95). 
The trial court found that during the 5-year period from the entry of the Decree 
Petitioner's income increased by 92% while Respondent's income increased by only 5%. 
(R. 198). Based on these changes in the respective incomes of the parties, the trial court 
opined that the " . . . difference in the increases is, by itself, sufficient to establish a 
substantial material change in circumstances." (R. 198). 
There is no dispute over the amount of the respective changes in income of the 
parties. There is also no dispute whether these changes represent a substantial material 
change in circumstances. Rather, the dispute is (a) whether these changes were 
contemplated at the time of entry of the Decree; and (b) whether the word "permanent," 
as used in the Decree concerning the payment of alimony, was intended to mean that 
alimony should continue indefinitely and in the same amount that was ordered in the 
Decree. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Petitioner urges this Court to accept that it was well known at the time of the divorce 
that she was pursuing a new career in nursing and that her income would substantially 
increase. Based on that alleged fact, Petitioner further urges this Court to conclude that 
such fact was contemplated and considered in determining the amount of the alimony 
award. However, Petitioner fails to establish a link between what she believes was well 
known by the parties and what factors the trial court actually used in determining the 
alimony award. 
The record in the trial court clearly shows that the alimony award was based on an 
equalization of the parties' incomes. There is not a scintilla of evidence that the trial 
court contemplated the potential or likelihood that Petitioner's income would 
substantially increase. What may have been in the minds of the parties, and perhaps the 
trial court, was never made part of the record, nor included in the Findings of Fact or 
Conclusions of Law, nor part of the Decree. Without any evidence that Petitioner's 
increase in income was contemplated, Respondent's Petition to Modify was properly 
granted by the trial court. 
Finally, Petitioner suggests that the alimony award should not be disturbed because 
the Decree ordered the alimony to be "permanent." Petitioner's understanding of the 
word "permanent" is misplaced. With respect to alimony awards, the word "permanent" 
refers only to the term or number of years and not the amount. Further, this Court has 
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previously ruled that even an alimony award that is deemed permanent is subject to the 
statutory authority of the trial court to modify alimony awards based on a substantial 
material change in circumstances not contemplated at the time of the divorce. Therefore, 
the trial court properly terminated the alimony award based on its finding that Petitioner's 
income exceeds Respondent's income and based on its finding that Petitioner's increase 
in income was not contemplated at the time of the divorce. 
ARGUMENT 
Whether the trial court abused its discretion by granting Respondent's 
Petition to Modify Alimony on the basis that Petitioner's increase in income 
represents a substantial change of circumstances not contemplated when the 
divorce Decree was entered. 
I. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting Respondent's Petition to 
eliminate alimony. 
After a trial held on March 2, 2004, the trial court entered its Order terminating 
alimony for Petitioner. (R. 197-199) (Addendum 1). In its Order, the trial court 
expressly stated the law, its findings, and its conclusions. Id. For example, the trial court 
stated the law on modifying a decree: 
The law grants to the Court authority to modify a divorce decree. The 
test is whether there has been a substantial material change in 
circumstances justifying such modification. Not only must there be a 
substantial change in circumstances, but it must be one not contemplated 
at the time of the divorce decree. 
(R. 197-98) (Addendum 1). 
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The trial court next made findings of fact on the respective incomes of the parties: 
The evidence, at the hearing, established that the [Petitioner's] income 
has risen to $4,192 a month, a 92% increase from the time of the 
divorce. Additionally, the evidence showed that her expenses had 
declined. The [Respondent's] income since the divorce has risen to 
$3,742 a month, an increase of approximately 5%. The difference in the 
increases is, by itself, sufficient to establish a substantial material 
change in circumstances. 
(R. 198) (Addendum 1). 
The trial court then turned its analysis to the issue of whether the substantial increase 
in Petitioner's income was foreseen or contemplated at the time of the divorce. Id. The 
trial court found the following: 
"A review of the Findings of Fact, the Decree and the transcript of the 
stipulation of the parties [at the time of the divorce] does not establish 
that future income from nursing was considered by the parties." 
Id. 
A. Petitioner's increase in income was not contemplated. 
It is important to note that Petitioner offers no evidence that the Petitioner's increase 
in income was foreseen or contemplated at the time of the divorce. Petitioner's Brief 
contains only self-serving statements concerning the possibility that an increase in 
Petitioner's income was contemplated. These self-serving statements were made by 
Petitioner during the trial held on Respondent's Petition to Modify. Pet. 's Br. at 3 (citing 
to Petitioner's testimony in the transcript of the trial on the Petition to Modify). It is also 
telling that Petitioner offers no citations to the Record prior to the entry of Findings of 
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Fact and Conclusions of Law at the time of the divorce. Therefore, Petitioner relies 
solely on the Decree and its supporting findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
Petitioner fails to marshal any evidence in support of or in opposition to the trial 
court's finding that " . . . the Findings of Fact, the Decree and the transcript of the 
stipulation of the parties does not establish that future income from nursing was 
considered by the parties." Simply put, Petitioner fails to identify or cite to any evidence 
that Petitioner's increase in income was contemplated during the divorce proceedings. 
There simply is no evidence that such an increase was contemplated. 
Had Petitioner's increase in income been contemplated, Petitioner could have easily 
expressed and articulated such contemplation in the Findings of Fact or in the Decree. 
After all, it was Petitioner's legal counsel who prepared such documents. (R. 76, 83). But 
those documents fail to contain even a scintilla of evidence that Petitioner's increase in 
income was contemplated. There is not one word nor one phrase within the four corners 
of these three documents that can reasonably be construed as contemplating any increase 
in Petitioner's income. An examination of these documents makes this point clear. 
At a Pre-Trial Conference, the parties entered on the record their stipulation for 
divorce. An examination of the transcript of the Pre-Trial Conference ("Pre-Trial 
Transcript") (herein as Addendum 4) shows that there was no contemplation of the 
Petitioner's increase in income. 
Petitioner cites only three times to the Pre-Trial Transcript. See Pet. fs Br. at 4-5. 
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One of those three citations concerns debts relating to Petitioner's "education." In her 
Brief, Petitioner states: 
"The original divorce decree contained references to the Petitioner's school 
loans for her recently completed nursing school. (R. 8414; R. 211, p.4)" 
Pet. 's Br. at 4 (emphasis added). 
However, there is no mention of "nursing school" in either document cited by 
Petitioner. In the Pre-Trial Transcript (R. 211 at 4) (Addendum 4), there is only a vague 
reference to debts for "her education." In the Decree (R. 84 f4) (Addendum 2), there is 
no mention of "education" nor "nursing school" nor any mention of the word "school." 
Even if "nursing school" had been mentioned, without more, it certainly does not show 
that an increase in Petitioner's income was contemplated in setting the amount of the 
alimony award. Merely mentioning a word or phrase does not necessarily show that such 
word or phrase was considered in determining the amount of alimony. 
Petitioner's only other citation to the Pre-Trial Transcript refers to the obvious 
contemplation that a change in Respondent's income would be a basis for review of the 
alimony award. 
"Upon a change of circumstances to the [Respondent], where the social 
security or his pension . . . or the disability is modified, or he obtains 
employment in the future, that would be a basis for the court to review 
the matter. . . with regard to the alimony award . . ." 
Pre-Trial Tr. at 5 (R. 211 at 5) (Addendum 4). 
Petitioner attempts to characterize the foregoing statement as a limit on what factors 
could be considered as a basis for modifying the alimony award. Petitioner's Brief uses 
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the word "only" to suggest that the Decree and the statement made at the Pre-Trial 
Conference were intended to restrict the conditions that could trigger a modification of 
the Decree. In her Brief, Petitioner makes the following statements: 
" . . . Judge Wilkinson ordered that the only change which could occur in 
modifying the alimony award would be a modification in the 
Respondent's income/benefits." (no citation provided) 
Pet.'s Br. at 4 (emphasis added). 
"Judge Dever did not take into account the undisputed evidence 
presented at trial by both parties nor the part of the transcript of the 
stipulation of the parties which limited changes in the alimony only 
upon changes in Respondent's income/benefits. (R. 211 at 5)" 
Pet. 's Br. at 5 (emphasis added). 
". . . Judge Wilkinson ruled that the only basis to modify the alimony award 
would be changes in the Respondent's income/benefits. (R. 84 P ) . " 
Pet. 's Br. at 9 (emphasis added). 
Petitioner also sites, in conjunction with the Pre-Trail Transcript, the sole paragraph 
in the Decree that addresses changes in Respondent's income^enefits: 
If unforeseen circumstances occur as to the amount of income received 
by the respondent, because of changes in his disability and/or changes in 
his disability income that the same shall be a basis for modification 
and/or review of the alimony as the court deems appropriate at the time 
and under the circumstances that exist at the time of occurrence of the 
substantial change of circumstances. 
Decree at 2 f 3 (Addendum 2). 
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From the statements made at the Pre-Trial Conference and from the foregoing 
provision in the Decree, Petitioner leaps to the unsupported and illogical conclusion that 
"only" a change in Respondent's income^enefits can justify a modification of the 
alimony award. That is, Respondent contends that by identifying in the Decree one factor 
that can trigger a modification in the alimony award no other factors can be considered 
for modifying the amount of alimony. That makes no sense. 
Petitioner urges this Court to conclude that Petitioner's increase in income was 
contemplated merely because " . . . it was well known by both parties at the time of the 
divorce that the Petitioner had just finished nursing school and was starting her career as a 
nurse." Pet, *s Br. at 8. However, Petitioner fails to link that knowledge, even if true, 
with the actual factors that were considered by the court in support of its alimony award. 
Without express findings or language in the record, it is impossible years later to know 
what factors determined the final alimony award. 
In Bolliger v. Bolliger, 2000 UT App 47, this Court stated the following: 
We do not believe it makes for good law or sound policy to 
have parties arguing years after the fact over what a trial court 
may or may not have considered when making an alimony 
award. Utah appellate courts have consistently required that 
trial courts make adequate findings on all material issues of 
alimony to reveal the reasoning followed in making the 
award. Consequently, if a trial court knows that a party will 
be receiving additional future income it should make findings 
as to whether such additional income will affect the alimony 
award. The court should therefore have considered how 
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[Petitioner's] future receipt of retirement benefits would alter 
her future financial conditions and her ability to provide for 
her own needs. It then should have determined whether her 
future income would affect the alimony award. 
Bolliger v. Bolliger, 2000 UT App 47 ^20 {quoting Johnson v. Johnson, 
855 P.2d 250, 253 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
In the instant case, if the trial court knew that Petitioner's career change to nursing 
would produce a substantial increase in her income, it should have made findings as to 
whether such additional income would affect the alimony award. Unfortunately for 
Petitioner, the trial court failed to do so. 
This Court also clarified the distinction between what was in the minds of the parties 
and what a court considers in determining an alimony award: 
The fact that the parties may have anticipated [a substantial material 
change in circumstances] in their own minds or in their discussions does 
not mean that the decree itself contemplates the change. In order for a 
material change in circumstances to be contemplated in a divorce decree 
there must be evidence, preferably in the form of a provision within the 
decree itself, that the trial court anticipated the specific change. 
Accordingly, if both the divorce decree and the record are bereft of any 
reference to the changed circumstance at issue in the petition to modify, 
then the subsequent changed circumstance was not contemplated in the 
original divorce decree. 
Bolliger v. Bolliger, 2000 UT App 47 f21 {quoting Durfee v. Durfee, 
796 P.2d 713, 716 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
At the time of the divorce, Petitioner's attorney drafted the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and the Decree of Divorce. He had ample opportunity to articulate 
what factors were considered in determining the amount of the alimony award and what 
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would or would not justify a modification of the alimony award. He was or should have 
been aware that those documents contained no linkage between what may have been well 
known to the parties and to the trial court and the alimony award. 
The common knowledge in Bolliger is similar to the knowledge Petitioner contends 
was "well known" in the instant case. In Bolliger, the parties had been married for 34 
years when they became divorced. Id. at f 2. Ten years later, both parties began receiving 
social security benefits. Id. at Tf3. It is obvious that the prospect of receiving social 
security benefits was well known by the parties at the time of the divorce. Nonetheless, 
there was no evidence nor any finding by the trial court that social security benefits were 
considered in determining the amount of the alimony award. Accordingly, this Court 
ruled in Bolliger that the receipt of social security benefits represented a substantial 
change in circumstances not contemplated at the time of the divorce. Id. at f 20. 
The instant case is similar. While it may have been well known, perhaps even 
obvious, that Petitioner would likely realize a substantial increase in income, there simply 
is no evidence that such knowledge was a factor in determining the amount of the 
alimony award. 
Petitioner fails to link the amount of the alimony award and the prospect of 
Petitioner's increase in income. This is particularly troublesome since the record 
consistently shows that the parties and the trial court set the amount of alimony based on 
the equalization of incomes of the parties. An examination of the record follows. 
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At the Pre-Trial Conference where the stipulation of the parties was entered on 
record, the following statements were made by counsel for the parties: 
"In any event, the amount of the monies, equalized, will be somewhere 
between approximately $750 to $810 from [Respondent] to 
[Petitioner]." 
Pre-Trial Transcript (R. 211 at 3) (Addendum 4) {emphasis added) 
(Petitioner's counsel stating, immediately after a discussion of the 
various sources and amounts of income of the parties, the amount of 
alimony that should be awarded to Petitioner). 
And, 
"My calculations are that the alimony might be $700 as to an 
equalization of the parties' income." 
Pre-Trial Transcript (R. 211 at 5) (Addendum 4) {emphasis added) 
(Respondent's counsel stating a correction). 
In the Findings of Fact the following statement is made: 
"Because of the length of the marriage it is appropriate that there be an 
equalization of income." 
(R. 77 f 5) (Addendum 3) {emphasis added). 
And the Conclusions of Law and the Decree state the following: 
"Based upon the length of the marriage, the economic circumstances 
between the parties including the respondent's disability it is appropriate 
that there be an equalization of income. The respondent is to pay to the 
petitioner the sum of $698 per month as alimony based upon her total 
monthly income of $2,154 and the respondent's total monthly income of 
$3,546 per month." 
(R. 78 1f2) (Addendum 3), (R. 84 ^ 2) (Addendum 2) {emphasis added). 
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The evidence in the record is clear. The intent of the parties and the trial court in 
setting the alimony award in the amount of $698 per month was intended to equalize the 
respective incomes of the parties. There is no other basis suggested, indicated or stated. 
"Accordingly, if both the divorce decree and the record are bereft of any reference to 
the changed circumstance at issue in the petition to modify, then the subsequent changed 
circumstance was not contemplated in the original divorce decree." Bolliger v. Bolliger, 
2000 UT App 47 f21 (quoting Durfee v. Durfee, 796 P.2d 713, 716 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990)). In the instant case, Petitioner's substantial increase in income was not 
contemplated in the original Decree, since there is no reference to such change in income. 
B. The word "permanent" does not limit the trial court's authority to modify 
the alimony award. 
Petitioner appears to rely on the word "permanent" to support her contention that the 
alimony award could not be terminated. Petitioner misconstrues the meaning of 
"permanent" in the context of an award of alimony. 
In Bolliger, this Court analyzed the meaning of "permanent." In referring to 
Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), this Court stated the following: 
Thus, even though this court ordered permanent alimony [in 
Munns], we approved the concept that receipt of social 
security or retirement benefits could amount to a substantial 
change of circumstances warranting a modification "upon 
appropriate petition." 
Bolliger v. Bolliger, 2000 UT App 47 |^18 (emphasis added). 
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In Bolliger, this court also discussed the trial court's reluctance to modify the 
alimony award because the alimony was deemed to be "permanent." 
The trial court also based its decision on the fact that the 
parties had agreed to permanent alimony in the original 
divorce decree, apparently determining that neither the parties 
nor the court could modify the permanent alimony award. 
However, even if permanent alimony is awarded, a later 
substantial material change of circumstances not foreseen at 
the time of the divorce can provide grounds for modifying the 
permanent alimony "upon appropriate petition." 
Id. atf21 {emphasis added). 
Any notion that the alimony award could not be modified is misplaced. The trial 
court has clear authority by statute1 and by law to modify the alimony award based on a 
substantial material change in circumstances not contemplated at the time of the divorce. 
The word "permanent" only refers to the number of years alimony is to be paid, not the 
amount of the alimony and not whether it should be terminated if justified by a substantial 
material change in circumstances. 
II. Respondent is entitled to his costs and attorney fees on appeal. 
If Respondent prevails, he should be awarded his costs and attorney fees incurred on 
appeal. See Bolliger v. Bolliger, 2000 UT App 47 |^26 ("trial court may award attorney 
fees in a modification proceeding"); see also, § 30-3-3(1), U.C.A. 
1
 § 30-3-5(8)(g)(i), U.C.A., clearly authorizes the trial court to modify an alimony 
award ". . . based on a substantial material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the 
time of the divorce." 
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Although attorney fees were not awarded to either party by the trial court, 
Respondent is entitled to have his costs and attorney fees paid by Petitioner for her failure 
to abide by the decision of the trial court. In Carter v. Carter, 584 P.2d 904 (Utah 1978), 
the ex-husband filed an appeal after the trial court partially granted a petition to modify a 
decree. When the ex-husband failed to prevail on appeal, the Utah Supreme Court 
awarded attorney fees and costs to the respondent and held the following: 
There is an additional matter which deserves attention. In 
regard to the proceeding below, the trial court ordered that the 
parties bear their own costs and attorneys' fees, which ruling 
neither party has contested here. However, the defendant 
argues that inasmuch as the plaintiff was unwilling to abide 
by the trial court's judgment, and that she has been put to the 
necessity of defending this appeal, the plaintiff should have to 
bear the costs thereof, including reasonable attorney's fees for 
her counsel. We agree with the reasonableness and propriety 
of her request. Therefore, the case is remanded for the 
purpose of determining and awarding her such attorney's fees 
as the trial court finds to be reasonable and properly incurred 
on this appeal. Costs to defendant (respondent). 
Carter v. Carter, 584 P.2d at 906. 
At a minimum, Respondent's costs on appeal should be awarded pursuant to Rule 34, 
Utah R. App. P. 
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CONCLUSION 
The record clearly shows that the alimony award was determined by equalizing the 
incomes of the parties. There is not a shred of evidence in the record to suggest that 
Petitioner's substantial increase in income was considered or contemplated at the time of 
the divorce. It is not what may have been in the minds of the parties or the trial court but 
what is in the record that counts. 
Although the Decree ordered "permanent" alimony, such word only refers to the term 
of the alimony and not the amount. This Court has previously ruled that permanent 
alimony is nonetheless subject to modification upon a showing that there has been a 
substantial material change in circumstances not contemplated at the time of the divorce. 
Based on the substantial change in circumstances not contemplated at the time of 
divorce, the trial court properly terminated alimony to Petitioner. 
Respondent also requests that he be awarded his reasonable attorney fees and costs 
incurred on appeal. 
DATED this 12th day of January 2005. 
Michael A. Jensen (723Q) / 
Counsel for Appellant/Respondent 
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Addendum 1 
By. 
Third Judith l>fe*aict 
API? 3 0 29G's 
^ , SALS LAKE COUNTY 
Deputy Ctoik 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR THE 
STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
CHRISTINE COREISSEN SMITH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ALAN BRUCE SMITH, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 97 490 0256 DA 
JUDGE L. A. DEVER 
This matter came before the Court on March 2, 2004, on Defendant's Petition 
to Modify. The parties were present and represented by Counsel. The Court heard 
testimony, received documentary evidence and heard argument of counsel. 
The law grants to the Court the authority to modify a divorce decree. The test 
is whether there has been a substantial material change in circumstances justifying 
such modification. Not only must there be a substantial change in circumstances, but 
it must be one not contemplated at the time of the divorce decree. 
When the parties divorced the plaintiff's income was $2154.00 a month and 
the defendant's income was $3546.00 a month. 
The evidence, at the hearing, established that the plaintiff's income has risen to 
$4192.00 a month, a 92% increase from the time of the divorce. Additionally, the 
evidence showed that her expenses had declined. The defendant's income since the 
divorce has risen to $3742.00 a month, an increase of approximately 5%. The 
difference in the increases is, by itself, sufficient to establish a substantial material 
change in circumstances. 
Was the substantial increase in the income of the plaintiff foreseen at the time 
of the divorce? A review of the Findings of Fact, the Decree and the transcript of the 
stipulation of the parties does not establish that future income from nursing was 
considered by the parties. 
Case law is clear on the issue of foreseeability. There must be some evidence 
in the record of consideration of the possible effect of the change or it will be viewed 
as unanticipated and therefore available for consideration as a change of 
circumstances. 
The Court finds that there has been an unanticipated change of circumstances 
and that the change has been substantial warranting a conclusion that alimony should 
be terminated. Alimony to the plaintiff is terminated effective March 2, 2004. 
Dated this 30th day of April, 2004. 
BY THE COURT 
L A . 
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Randy S Ludlow #2011 
Attorney for Petitioner 
336 South 300 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-1300 
Fax: (801)322-1628 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CHRISTINE CORLEISSEN SMITH, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
ALAN BRUCE SMITH, 
Respondent. : 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Case No. 974900256DA 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
THE ABOVE ENTITLED MATTER came on for pretrial on the 30th day of October, 1997 
before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, judge of the above entitled court. The petitioner was 
present and represented by her attorney of record, Randy S. Ludlow. The respondent was present 
and represented by his attorney of record, Jane Allen. The court having previously entered its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and now, based upon such and for good cause appearing 
herein 
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. The petitioner is awarded a Decree of Divorce from the respondent which Decree shall 
become final upon entry. 
2. Based upon the length of the marriage, the economic circumstances between the parties 
including the respondent's disability it is appropriate that there be an equalization of income. The 
respondent is to pay to the petitioner the sum of $698.00 per month as alimony based upon her total 
monthly income of $2,154 and the respondents total monthly income of $3,546.00 per month. The 
alimony as to be paid herein is a permanent alimony. 
3. If unforseen circumstances occur as to the amount of income received by the respondent, 
because of changes in his disability and/or changes in his disability income that the same shall be a 
basis for modification and/or review of the alimony as the court deems appropriate at the time and 
under the circumstances that exist at the time of occurrence of the substantial change of 
circumstances. 
4. The Northwest Pipeline 401k has a value of approximately $190,000. The parties are to 
withdraw from that account sufficient funds to pay in their entirety the debts and obligations owing 
on the second mortgage of approximately $8,499, the Westminster-Perkins Loan of $228.00, the 
Stafford Loan of approximately $20,000, the SLS Loan of approximately $2,112.00, the University 
of Utah Credit Union Loan of $4,758 and the MasterCard of approximately $7,350.00 together with 
sufficient funds to pay the taxes from the money withdrawn from said account. The parties will 
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thereafter file a joint tax return for the year 1997 with the parties being jointly responsible for the 
taxes upon said tax return. 
The remaining 401k having a value of approximately $125,000 is such that the remaining 
amount would be solely owned and held by the respondent on him transferring and giving over to the 
petitioner all equity in the parties' home together with $5,000. The respondent would be solely 
responsible for all tax liabilities associated with the remaining balance on the 401k with Northwest 
Pipeline. As a result of the transfers contained in the Decree it would equalize the accounts between 
the parties. 
5. The petitioner is awarded as her sole and separate property the Prudential and AT&T 
accounts together with all of her inheritances, her IRA's and her 401k free and clear of any claim by 
the respondent. 
The respondent is to be awarded the IRA of the petitioner's which is in the sum of $3,800 free 
and clear of any claim by the petitioner. 
6. The petitioner is awarded one-half (Vi) of all retirements, pension plans, annuities which 
have been acquired by the respondent and a Qualified Domestic Relations Order shall issue for the 
distribution of the same. 
7. The parties have two accounts which have been maintained for the parties' child, Beth's, 
education. Those accounts are at the University of Utah Credit Union in the sum of approximately 
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$4,000 and a Certificate of Deposit at the University of Utah Credit Union in the sum of 
approximately $5,200. Those items will remain for the parties' child's education solely. 
8. The parties have obtained insurances during the course of the marriage. The petitioner will 
remain as the beneficiary on the Oldline life insurance policy which has a face value of approximately 
$100,000, policy number 5 1364551L, which is insuring the life of the respondent. 
The parties will be joint beneficiaries on the Oldline life insurance policy which has a face 
value of $40,000 policy number 5 168973 9L which insures the petitioner. If the parties jointly decide 
to surrender the $40,000 policy they shall do the same pursuant to a written agreement and equally 
divide the surrender value of said policy. 
9. The home and real property that was acquired during the marriage by the parties and is 
more particularly described as follows: 
Lot 13, Lazy Bar No. 2 Subdivision, according to the official plat thereof on file and 
of record in the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office. 
is awarded to the petitioner free and clear of any claim by the respondent. The petitioner is to pay 
the first mortgage owing upon the real property and to hold the respondent harmless from the same. 
10. Each party shall be responsible for their own attorneys fees and costs incurred in this 
matter. 
11. Each party is awarded those items of personal property they presently hold in their 
possession free and clear of any claim by the other. 
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12. The petitioner is awarded the automobile in her possession together with the debt and 
obligation owing against the same. 
13. The respondent is awarded the truck presently in his possession free and clear of any 
claim by the petitioner. 
14. Each party is required to sign any and all documents necessary to carry out the terms and 
provisions of the Decree of Divorce. 
DATED this ^ day o*&tecfa> 1998. 
BY THE COURT: 
00005197.98 5 
Addendum 3 
Randy S.Ludlow #2011 
Attorney for Petitioner 
336 South 300 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-1300 
Fax: (801) 322-1628 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CHRISTINE CORLEISSEN SMITH, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
ALAN BRUCE SMITH, 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 974900256DA 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
THE ABOVE ENTITLED MATTER came on for pretrial on the 30th day of October, 1997 
before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, judge of the above entitled court The petitioner was 
present and represented by her attorney of record, Randy S. Ludlow. The respondent was present 
and represented by his attorney of record, Jane Allen. The court having give preliminary rulings as 
to various matters and based upon such the parties thereafter entered into a stipulation which was 
deemed by the court to be equitable and just. Pursuant to the stipulation the respondent withdrew 
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his answer and allowed his default to be entered by the court. Now, based upon such and for good 
cause appearing in this matter, the court makes these its 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The parties are residents of Salt Lake County, state of Utah and have been for more than 
three (3) months immediately prior to the commencement of this action. 
2. The petitioner and respondent are wife and husband having been married on August 2, 1968 
in Provo, Utah. 
3. During the marriage irreconcilable differences have arisen between the parties making 
continuation of the marriage impossible. 
4. During the course of the marriage the parties had born as issue to them three (3) children all 
of whom are now emancipated. 
5. Because of the length of the marriage it is appropriate that there be an equalization of income. 
The petitioner earns from her employment and from her sales of Mary Kay cosmetics a total 
monthly income of $2,154.00. 
The respondent earns from social security the sum of approximately $1,359.00 and 
from Northwest Pipeline Disability Insurance the sum of approximately $2,187.00 for a total 
of $3,546. Based upon such it is appropriate that the respondent pay to the petitioner the sum 
of $698.00 per month alimony. 
00005161.98 2 
6. The parties have acquired numerous items of real and personal property between them 
together with stocks, retirement accounts, 401k's, all of which should be equitably divided. 
7. There have been numerous debts which have been acquired during the course of the marriage 
including monies for the petitioner's student loans. The student loans were necessary for 
petitioner to be able to earn an income. The petitioner had previously been a homemaker and 
has only been into the workforce for a very short period of time. As such it is appropriate the 
parties recognize and pay off the petitioner's student loans as well as their other debts and 
obligations. 
Now, based upon the Findings of Fact, the court makes these its 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The petitioner is awarded a Decree of Divorce from the respondent which Decree shall 
become final upon entry. 
2. Based upon the length of the marriage, the economic circumstances between the parties 
including the respondent's disability it is appropriate that there be an equalization of income. The 
respondent is to pay to the petitioner the sum of $698.00 per month as alimony based upon her total 
monthly income of $2,154 and the respondents total monthly income of $3,546.00 per month. The 
alimony as to be paid herein is a permanent alimony. 
3. If unforseen circumstances occur as to the amount of income received by the respondent, 
because of changes in his disability and/or changes in his disability income that the same shall be a 
00005161.98 3 
basis for modification and/or review of the alimony as the court deems appropriate at the time and 
under the circumstances that exist at the time of occurrence of the substantial change of 
circumstances. 
4. The Northwest Pipeline 401k has a value of approximately $190,000. The parties are to 
withdraw from that account sufficient funds to pay in their entirety the debts and obligations owing 
on the second mortgage of approximately $8,499, the Westminster-Perkins Loan of $228.00, the 
Stafford Loan of approximately $20,000, the SLS Loan of approximately $2,112.00, the University 
of Utah Credit Union Loan of $4,758 and the MasterCard of approximately $7,350.00 together with 
sufficient funds to pay the taxes from the money withdrawn from said account. The parties will 
thereafter file a joint tax return for the year 1997 with the parties being jointly responsible for the 
taxes upon said tax return. 
The remaining 401k having a value of approximately $125,000 is such that the remaining 
amount would be solely owned and held by the respondent on him transferring and giving over to the 
petitioner all equity in the parties' home together with $5,000. The respondent would be solely 
responsible for all tax liabilities associated with the remaining balance on the 401k with Northwest 
Pipeline. As a result of the transfers contained in the Decree it would equalize the accounts between 
the parties. 
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5. The petitioner is awarded as her sole and separate property the Prudential and AT&T 
accounts together with all of her inheritances, her IRA's and her 401k free and clear of any claim by 
the respondent. 
The respondent is to be awarded the IRA of the petitioner's which is in the sum of $3,800 free 
and clear of any claim by the petitioner. 
6. The petitioner is awarded one-half QA) of all retirements, pension plans, annuities which 
have been acquired by the respondent and a Qualified Domestic Relations Order shall issue for the 
distribution of the same. 
7. The parties have two accounts which have been maintained for the parties' child, Beth's, 
education. Those accounts are at the University of Utah Credit Union in the sum of approximately 
$4,000 and a Certificate of Deposit at the University of Utah Credit Union in the sum of 
approximately $5,200. Those items will remain for the parties' child's education solely. 
8. The parties have obtained insurances during the course of the marriage. The petitioner will 
remain as the beneficiary on the Oldline life insurance policy which has a face value of approximately 
$100,000, policy number 5 1364551L, which is insuring the life of the respondent. 
The parties will be joint beneficiaries on the Oldline life insurance policy which has a face 
value of $40,000 policy number 5 1689739L which insures the petitioner. If the parties jointly decide 
to surrender the $40,000 policy they shall do the same pursuant to a written agreement and equally 
divide the surrender value of said policy. 
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9. The home and real property that was acquired during the marriage by the parties and is 
more particularly described as follows: 
Lot 13, Lazy Bar No. 2 Subdivision, according to the official plat thereof on file and 
of record in the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office. 
is awarded to the petitioner free and clear of any claim by the respondent The petitioner is to pay 
the first mortgage owing upon the real property and to hold the respondent harmless from the same. 
10. Each party shall be responsible for their own attorneys fees and costs incurred in this 
matter. 
11. Each party is awarded those items of personal property they presently hold in their 
possession free and clear of any claim by the other. 
12. The petitioner is awarded the automobile in her possession together with the debt and 
obligation owing against the same. 
13. The respondent is awarded the truck presently in his possession free and clear of any 
claim by the petitioner. 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
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14. Each party is required to sign any and all documents necessary to carry out the terms and 
provisions of the Decree of Divorce. 
DATED this <P^day <#Weh, 1998. 
BY THE COURT: 
00005161.98 7 
Addendum 4 
Third Judicial District 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICTS C 2 fl 199? 
SMftLAKE COUNTY 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH: DIVISION f )£,,., i^u—, 
CHRISTINE COREISSEN SMITH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ALAN BRUCE SMITH, 
Defendant. 
Reporter's Transcript of Hearing 
at Pre-trial Conference Proceedings: 
Settlement Enunciation 
Case No. 974900256 
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 30th day of October. 1997. 
the above-entitled matter came on for hearing in the chambers area of Courtroom 
No. 502 of the Courts Building, Metropolitan Hall of Justice, 240 East 400 South, 
Salt Lake City, UT before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, Judge in the Third 
Judicial District, State of Utah. 
APPEARANCES 
JANE ALLEN. Attorney-at-Law. 310 South Main, Suite 1314, Salt 
Lake City, UT 84101 Telephone 355-1300 Fax 532-6502 appearing with and on behalf 
of thej^jfftffr. X> & ^e^^vdr/iZ-^fft^etct 
RANDY S. LUDLOW. Attorney-at-Law. 336 South 300 East, Suite 
200, Salt Lake City, UT 84111 Telephone 531-1300 Fax 322-1628 appearing with and 
on behalf of the Defentlant. __
 /K/ 
ORIGINAL 
an 
1 (Whereupon, the following proceedings were had in open court:) 
2 THE COURT: The record may show that this is the time and place 
3 for the pre-trial of this matter. The court has discussed the case with counsel; they've 
4 talked to their clients; and they indicate they have a disposition. Who wishes to read it 
5 into the record? 
6 MR. LUDLOW: I'll do it; I'll do the papers. Your Honor, the 
7 decree of divorce will be entered on the grounds of irreconcilable differences. There are 
8 no minor children of the parties. All the children are emancipated. 
9 As relates to residency, the parties have been residents of Salt Lake 
10 County for three months prior to the commencement of this action. The parties are 
11 disolving a 29-year marriage. We're going to be equalizing the income between the 
12 parties. It would be based on — we're going to be reviewing that to make sure the 
13 figures are correct - but approximately the income to the plaintiff, from her wages, will 
14 be $2114, and from her Mary Kay Cosmetics, $40 per month, for $2154. 
15 And then from the Defendant, from Social Security approximately 
16 $1359, and Northwest Disability approximately $2187 per month. And what we have 
17 to check on is whether or not the dividends that have been paid over to the Defendant, 
18 if they would be there in the future, based upon whether they come out of the AESOP 
19 plan. If they're part of the 401K, if they're part of the AEOSP plan, it would be $250 
20 a month. The basic difference is possibly $3,375. 
2 
1 In any event, the amount of the monies, equalized, will be somewhere 
2 between approximately $750 to $810 from the Defendant to the Plaintiff. 
3 The parties have mutual debts, and monies will be taken out of the 
4 401K in order to pay off these debts in their entirety, including the second mortgage of 
5 $8,499, approximately; the Westminster-Perkins loan of $228; the Stafford loan of 
6 $20,000; the SLS approximately $2112; the University of Utah, $4758; and the 
7 Mastercard of $7350. The amounts represent approximately $42, 947. 
8 The parties will in fact file joint tax returns for the year 1997 and 
9 be responsible jointly for the monies that are withdrawn from the 401K and ordered to 
10 pay off these debts. 
11 Additionally, there will be — the account, the 401K, will be 
12 equalized, and it is presently $96,000, and the monies from that account — which will be 
13 $96,000 to the Plaintiff- she will reimburse to the Defendant approximately $40,000. 
14 Because of the fact that the parties will be filing joint tax returns, 
15 those monies that will appear on it, she will be paying the tax that is incurred, the joint 
16 tax return, for that $40,000 debt. 
17 The inheritances that she will receive, which are presently held in 
18 the Prudential and AT&T accounts, will be awarded to her solely. With the inheritance 
19 that is approximately $3800 on the IRA, that would be awarded to the Defendant. 
20 He waives any claim to the 401K, that she has, which has been acquired prior to her — 
3 
1 since the time they were separated, which is now approximately $5,000. 
2 The parties have two debts — excuse me, amounts owing, of which 
3 there is the U Credit Union of approximately $4,000, and a CD at the U of U Credit 
4 Union of approximately $5200. Those have been for her education and they will remain 
5 debts. 
6 Additionally, there have been insurances that have been obtained 
7 by the parties during the marriage. The Plaintiff will remain as the beneficiary on the 
8 Old Lawn Life insurance, which is in the amount of $100,000, and it is insuring the life 
9 of the Defendant. 
10 The parties will jointly be beneficiaries on the Old Lawn Life 
11 insurance of the $40,000 which includes — inures to the Plaintiff. If they decide to 
12 surrender it under a joint agreement, they both will take whatever the monies are of that 
13 particular account and divide that equally. 
14 The Plaintiff will be awarded her — I'm sorry, the Plaintiff will be 
15 awarded the house free and clear of any claim by the Defendant. She will be required 
16 to pay the first mortgage on that home and to hold him harmless from the same. 
17 As stated earlier, the equity is paid out of the — she's reimbursing 
18 him for his equity in the 401K. Each party will bear the responsibility for their own 
19 attorneys fees that have been incurred in this matter. 
20 The Plaintiff will be entitled to one-half of the retirement pension 
4 
1 plans, that have been acquired during the marriage, of the Defendant. He'll be awarded 
2 the truck that is in his possession; she'll be awarded the car and the 
3 debt that is owed against it that is in her possession. The Caravan has been turned over 
4 to the parties' son. Each party will be awarded the items of personal property presently 
5 held in their own possession. 
6 Upon a change of circumstances to the Defendant, where the social 
7 Security or his pension — excuse me, or the disability is modified, or he obtains 
8 employment in the future, that would be a basis for the court to review the matter. 
9 With regard to the alimony award — . 
10 MS. ALLEN: I have a couple of questions, corrections, to the last 
11 one: That a change of circumstances would also be retiring. My calculations are that 
12 the alimony might be $700 as to an equalization of the parties' income; that the $96,000 
13 split on the IRA is its present value; and at the time we actually divide it, that could be 
14 higher or lower, since there have been fluctuations in the stock market. We assume it 
15 would be half. The other -- the qualified stipulation recovery pension, that's not that 
16 one. I think that's all. 
17 MR. LUDLOW: Yes, your Honor. 
18 THE COURT: Let me ask the parties: Ma'am, you're the Plaintiff 
19 in this action. You've heard the stipulation. Do you understand it? 
20 THE PLAINTIFF: Yes. 
5 
1 THE COURT: Are you willing to accept it and live by it? 
2 THE PLAINTIFF: Yes. 
3 THE COURT: Sir, you're the Defendant. You've heard the 
4 stipulation. Do you understand it? 
5 THE DEFENDANT: Pretty well. Yes. 
6 THE COURT: Are you willing to accept it and live by it? 
7 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
8 THE COURT: The court will accept the stipulation. Now, I sassume 
9 that your answer and/or counterclaim may be withdrawn, and that they may proceed 
10 to take the divorce? 
11 MS. ALLEN: Yes. 
12 THE COURT: Who's going to prepare the pleadings? 
13 MR. LUDLOW: I said I would. I'll send them to Ms. Allen before. 
14 THE COURT: Thank you. You may be excused. 
15 THE DEFENDANT: Thank you, your Honor. 
16 (Whereupon, the Defendant and and Defendant's Counsel 
17 were excused from and left the proceedings; after which, the 
18 instant proceedings continued in open court:) 
19 THE COURT: Your client's been sworn. You may proceed. 
20 (Whereupon, CHRISTINE COREISSEN SMITH, Plaintiff 
6 
1 in the above-entitled matter, and have first been duly 
2 sworn to tell the truth, testified upon her oath as follows:) 
3 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
4 BY MR. LUDLOW: 
5 Q Please state your name and address. 
6 A Christine Coreissen Smith, 2434 East Sundown Avenue, Salt Lake City, 
7 Utah, 
8 Q Ma'am, have you been a resident of Salt Lake County, state of Utah for 
9 more than three months prior to the time you filed this action? 
10 A Yes. 
11 Q You allege in the complaint irreconcilable differences between you and the 
12 defendant. Is that in the nature of the fact that, because of the disabliity, he becomes 
13 violent and uncontrolled, and you have gotten to the point where you cannot live 
14 together any longer? 
15 A Yes. 
16 Q And given the fact of that disability, is there a real risk of danger to your 
17 person, and to your daughter, too? 
18 A Yes. 
19 THE COURT: The court does find that, based on the testimony of 
20 the Plaintiff, there are sufficient grounds of divorce and does grant a divorce to the 
7 
1 Plaintiff, Christine Coreissen Smith, on the grounds of irreconcilable differences, the 
2 same to become final upon entry. Thank you, ma'am. Thank you, counsel. 
3 (Whereupon, at the hour of 4:10 p.m., the instant 
4 proceedings came to a close.) 
5 
6 REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
7 
8 I, Ed Midgley, Official Court Reporter in the Third Judicial District, 
9 State of Utah, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing proceedings were, by me, 
10 stenographically reported at the times and places herein set forth; that said report so 
11 transcribed was, by me, subsequently reduced to printed form, consisting of the 
12 enumerated pages herein appearing; and that said report so transcribed constitutes a 
13 true and correct transcription of evidence adduced, testimony given and/or proceedings 
14 had as at the instant proceedings hereinabove represented. 
15 To which certification I hereby set my hand this 23rd day of 
16 December, 1997, at Salt Lake City. 
17 
18 
19 Ed Midgley, Official Court Reporter 
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